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REPORTER'S SHIELD LAWS:
STATUS OF THE LEGISLATIVE
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE
The recent, much-publicized imprisonment of New York Times reporter
Myron Farber' has brought renewed attention to the struggle of journalists to
keep their confidential sources secret in response to judicial subpoenas. Often
choosing fines and jail over disclosure, 2 newsmen have contended that in order
to effectively carry out their media function they must be privileged from
divulging their news informants in all legal proceedings.
Into this fray, on the side of journalists, have entered a majority of state
legislatures as well as many Congressmen. 3 They have endeavored to offer
statutory protection-so-called "shield laws" 4 -which would exempt re-
porters5 from having to testify as to their confidential sources. In spite of
being protected by these statutes,. however, Farber and other journalists have
found themselves facing contempt citations for refusing to reveal information
supposedly privileged in their states.6
1. State v. Jascalevich, 158 N.J. Super. 488, 386 A.2d 466 affd sub nom, In re Myron Farber, 78 N.J.
259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3369 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Farber). Farber was
fined $1,000 and sentenced to jail on criminal and civil contempt charges for refusing to turn over
notes relating to his sources in response to a subpoena duces tecum in a New Jersey murder trial.
In addition, his employer, the New York Times, was fined $100,000 plus $5,000 a day until the
material was handed over. Farber was eventually released upon the defendant's acquittal after spending
40 days in confinement and the New York Times ended up paying $285,000 in fines.
2. Since 1972 over 40 reporters have been held in contempt of court for refusing to divulge their sources,
and more than 12 have gone to jail. Newsweek, August 7, 1978, at 87.
3. Although Congress has yet to enact a federal shield law privileging a reporter's relationship with his
source, such legislation has been periodically introduced since 1929. Some proposals would have created
a uniform national shield statute for journalists by extending any federal evidentiary legislation to be
applicable to state proceedings as well, either on the basis of congressional power to regulate interstate
commerce or through Congress' enforcement clause authority in the fourteenth amendment in conjunction
with the first amendment. In the meantime, newsmen have achieved some success on the federal level
with the Justice Department guidelines which require negotiation with the news media and the express
approval of the Attorney General before department personnel may seek a subpoena of a reporter's
confidential sources. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1976).
Federal privilege legislation came closest to fruition in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's
denying newsmen a constitutional testimonial privilege in Branzburg v. Hayeg, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate held extensive hearings on a newsman's privilege,
ultimately studying, in the process, over 100 separate shield bills, but Congress' inability to agree on
the form or scope of a shield statute kept legislation from leaving committee. See generally, Hearings
on H.R. 837 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.(1972); Hearings on H.R. 717 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Congress, 1st Sess. (1973); and Hearings on S. 36 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Congress, 1st Sess., at 9 (1973). The House reconvened
another committee on the subject in 1975, but again with no substantive results. Hearings on H.R.
215 Before Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The Farber court's invalidation of New Jersey's
shield statute has renewed congressional interest in the passage of a federal shield law. Two bills
creating a federal privilege were introduced in the closing days of the 95th Congress in 1978, but
because of their late introduction, neither got beyond the hearing stage. The Constitution Subcommittee
of the Senate is presently conducting hearings on the issue in the current session of Congress, however,
and has several proposed shield bills under consideration. Numerous collateral shield statutes have also
been introduced which would protect against police searches of newspaper offices for confidential notes
and materials, a practice recently validated by the Supreme Court in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547 (1978).
4. The term "shield law" is commonly applied to statutes granting members of the news media the
privilege of declining to reveal their confidential sources and information in administrative, legislative,
and judicial proceedings.
5. The terms "reporters," "newsmen," and "journalists" are only generic shorthand devices used
interchangeably to describe any person who disseminates news and information to the public. They
are used to signify news media personnel in general, and are not meant to imply limitation solely to
the print media.
6. See, e.g., Farber, 78 N.J. at 270, 394 A.2d at 335. The New Jersey Supreme Court expressly
acknowledged that Farber came fully within the literal language of New Jersey's shield law.
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These occurrences raise serious questions as to the ability of legislatures
to grant newsmen an evidentiary privilege against compulsory disclosure of
their sources in legal forums. Specifically, to what extent are legislative shield
laws able to provide the testimonial privilege sought by journalists? Do present
shield statutes actually afford newsmen much protection?
This note will explore these issues through an analysis of the various
reporters' shield laws presently in force. It will review the type and scope of
privilege they offer and their effectiveness in providing newsmen with a
testimonial privilege against compelled disclosure of confidential sources. Next,
this note will examine the judiciary's response to newsmens' privilege legislation.
Finally, it will attempt to ascertain what the future may hold for shield law
legislation in light of past and present state and federal court rulings.
A TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE FOR REPORTERS: A BRIEF HISTORY
Newsmen have long and persistently asserted a testimonial privilege protecting
the confidentiality of their news source relationships from compulsory disclosure.
Traditionally concerned that the widespread use of confidential informants7 would
be seriously disrupted by disclosure, journalists as far back as 1848 resisted
Congressional and judicial efforts to elicit their sources of news stories.8 Initially,
recognition of a common law privilege 9 analogous to that of the attorney-client
or government-informant 10 was sought; however, this approach found almost
universal judicial rejection. 11 Other early arguments advanced for a testimonial
privilege-that disclosure of sources contravened the journalistic code of ethics,
violated newspaper employer's regulations, or caused forfeiture of employment
and estate-met a similar fate. 12 Some subsequent success in refusing to divulge
confidential sources was achieved by various reporters on fifth amendment
grounds, 13 but this basis for a privilege did not permit widespread use, since
before granting it, courts usually required some substantiation of the
self-incrimination which would result from the revelation of sources. 14
7. This is particularly true in investigative 'reporting. Murasky, The Journalist's Privilege: Branzburg and
Its Aftermath, 52 Texas L. Rev. 829, 830 (1974).
8. Ex parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471 (No. 10, 375) (D.C. Cir. 1848). Nugent's incarceration by the
Senate for refusing to reveal his sources is thought to be the first reported newsman's privilege case
in the United States. Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case for a Federal
Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 160, 161 (1976).
9. Common law recognized four relationships which, because of public interest, gave rise to privileged
communications: attorney-client, husband-wife, government-informant, juror-juror. In addition, two
others, physician-patient and clergyman-penitent, have received almost universal statutory implementation.
Comment, Chipping Away at the First Amendment: Newspapermen Must Disclose Sources, 7 Akron
L. Rev. 129 (1973).
10. The informer's privilege is perhaps the closest analogy to the newsman's privilege, because in other
privileges it is the "communication" which is privileged, while in the case of the government and the
informant the identity of the "source" is protected. The analogy is bolstered by the fact that both
privileges are justified on the presumption that without them, valuable information would be lost to
society. Note, however, that the government-informant privilege is not absolute; law enforcement officials
must reveal confidential informants when the defendant otherwise would not be afforded a fair trial
as guaranteed under the Constitution. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); McCray v.
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). The informer's privilege, however, is not founded on a constitutional
guarantee.
11. The leading case is People v. Sheriff, 268 N.Y. 582, 199 N.E. "415 (Ct. App. 1936), in which the
court refused to recognize a common law privilege for reporters. See also, e.g., Adams v. Associated
Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969), in which the court denied the assertion of a common law
privilege on the grounds that no common law privilege for reporters had ever been recognized.
12. Comment, Tennessee Grants Newsmen a Qualified Disclosure Shield, 4 Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 143,
145 (1973).
13. "No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. , U.S.
Const. amend. V.
14. See, e.g., Elwell v. United States, 275 F. 775 (7th Cir. 1921), appeal dismissed, 263U.S. 676(1923).
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Concerned about the lack of protection given a journalist from forced
disclosure of his confidential sources, legislatures began to offer journalists
statutory assistance in the form of shield laws which privileged, to various
degrees, the news source relationship. Enactments were slow in coming, however,
with only a dozen states prior to 1964 actually passing shield statutes. 15 Because
of the limited availability of such statutes and uneven protection they provided,
reporters opted to concentrate on obtaining a constitutional privilege of
nondisclosure based on the cornerstone of their profession, the first
amendment. 16 Journalists contended that disclosure of their confidential sources
or information1 7 would have a "chilling effect" and cause their informants to
dry up, thus significantly impairing journalists' ability to gather and report
the news. 18 In turn, this would place an impermissible burden on public access
to the free flow of information, news, and ideas in violation of a public right
founded on the first amendment's interest in a vigorous and relatively
unencumbered press. 19  Hence, the constitutional testimentary privilege
asserted was not for newsmen personally, but ultimately for the benefit of the
public. 20
From the outset, courts rejected the contention of an absolute first amendment
privilege, 21 holding that no right or liberty, including freedom of the press,
was absolute, while the public had an overriding right to every man's evidence
in order to identify and punish wrongdoers. Some courts did recognize a
qualified constitutional privilege, however, holding that the fair, effective, and
orderly administration of justice only necessitated impairment of the first
amendment freedoms, and hence a duty to testify, when the disclosure of a
newsman's confidential sources "went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim."' 22
For a decade and a half the subject remained unsettled. 23
15. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New
Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
16. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press . . . ., U.S. Const.
amend. I.
17. With the groundwork for news stories increasingly being laid with off-the-record information, newsmen
have sought to have the substance of confidential communications also included within the testimonial
privilege accorded them.
18. E.g., Note, A Study in Governmental Separation of Powers: Judicial Response to State Shield
Laws, 66 Geo. L.J. 1273 (1978); 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev., supra note 8, at 161. For statistical studies
of the chilling effect, see, e.g., Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 Mich. L.
Rev. 229 (1971); Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their
Sources. 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 18 (1969). See also, Hearings on S. 36, supra note 3, at 9 (statement
by Walter Cronkite).
19. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). The Court held that the first amendment rests
on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information is essential to the public
welfare.
20. U.S. v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976). It has particularly been contended that with the
widespread classification of governmental information and restraints on governmental spokesmen,
discouraging inside informers would substantially jeopardize the public's ability to know about the
government and its institutions, thus jeopardizing the very essence of intelligent self-government. See,
e.g., Hearings on S. 36, supra note 3, at 6 (statement of Senators Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Chairman).
Note, however, that unlike other privileges, the newsman's privilege is not that of the informant
but personal to the journalist. Only the reporter can invoke it, and he may waive the privilege and
disclose his confidential sources and information regardless of the wishes of the informant. See. e.g.,
Lipps v. State, 254 Ind. 141, 258 N.E. 2d 622 (1970); Hestand v. State, 257 Ind. 191, 273 N.E. 2d
622 (1971); Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Printing & Pub. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (1964);
Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, affd 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972),cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973), Mont. Rev. Codes § 93-601-2 (Supp. 1977).
21. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied. 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
22. Id. at 550.
23. A majority of courts refuse to grant newsmen a privilege in any form. 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev., supra
note 8, at 170. Additionally, the Supreme Court declined to hear the issue on a number of occasions.
However, the 1964 decision of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), concerning libel
recoveries, indicated that conduct tending to restrain the flow of news would be presumed unconstitutional
unless strongly justified. This seemed to support the idea of at least a qualified testimonial privilege
being available to the media under the first amendment.
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The Supreme Court finally addressed the question of a- newsman's
constitutional right to protect the confidentiality of his source in 1972 in
Branzburg v. Hayes 24 and yielded four different judicial opinions on the issue.
Five justices held that newsmen had no privilege under the first amendment
to keep the identity of news informants confidential, at least when properly
subpoenaed before a grand jury conducting a criminal investigation. 25 Justice
White, writing for the majority, did acknowledge, however, that newsgathering
was protected by the first amendment, 26 but held that the effect on newsgathering
of forcing journalists to reveal confidential sources was speculative in contrast
to the paramount public interest in law enforcement and effective grand jury
proceedings. 27 The majority stressed, however, that its decision did not preclude
Congress or state legislatures from creating a privilege for journalists, nor did
it prevent state courts from construing their own constitutions so as to recognize
a privilege.28
Justice Powell's pivotal concurring opinion, emphasized the "limited nature"
of the court's holding29 and that first amendment privilege claims must be
weighed with other constitutional and societal interests individually "on a case
by case basis."' 30 Three of the four dissenters, led by Justice Stewart, would
have. recognized a limited evidentiary privilege of nondisclosure under the first
amendment, 31 while Justice Douglas argued that the first amendment granted
reporters an absolute testimonial privilege. 32
The Branzburg decision took on special significance for legislators. The
court had left an overt invitation for legislatures to determine for themselves
the desirability and necessity of newsmen having a testimonial privilege. Without
a common law or constitutional privilege against compulsory disclosure of news
sources, whatever statutory protection legislatures provided remained as the
only effective and viable alternative on which newsmen could base a significant
testimonial privilege. Consequently, in the wake of Branzburg, state
legislatures hastened to put shield laws on the books or to strengthen existing
statutes.
24. 408 U.S. 665 (1972), hereinafter referred to as Branzburg. The decision actually involved three separate
cases consolidated on appeal, Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408
U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971), affd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); and
In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E. 2d 197 (1971), affd. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
25. Id. at 690-691.
26. Id. at 707.
27. Id. at 690.
28. "At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is
necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary
to address the evil discerned and, equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time
to time may dictate. There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment
limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to the
relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas. It goes without saying, of
course, that we are powerless to enact any bar to state courts responding in their own way and
construing their own constitutions so as to recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute."
Id. at 706.
29. Id. at 709.
30. Id. at 710.
31. The dissent held that in balancing the interests of the first amendment with the public function of
the grand jury, the first amendment would prevail unless the government could: "(1) show that there
is probable cause to believe that the newsman has information which is clearly relevant to a specific
probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative
means less destructive of first amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding
interest in the information." Id. at 743.
32. Id. at 712.
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STATE SHIELD LAWS
To date, 26 states have enacted some type of statutory shield granting
newsmen a testimonial privilege against disclosure of their confidential sources,
although one state's statute is no longer in effect. 33 The first shield law was
enacted by Maryland in 1896. The last seven shield statutes were implemented
within two years following the Branzburg decision. 34 Under such titles as
Reporters' Privilege Act, 35 Reporters' Confidence Act,36 and Free Flow of
Information Act,37 these 26 state legislatures have determined that in balancing
the societal interest in the availability of information with the public and
private interest in the just punishment of wrong-doing, "the news media: should
have the benefit of a substantial privilege not to reveal sources of information
or to disclose unpublished information. ' 38 Unfortunately, disagreement as to
the extent of that protection has resulted in wide differences in shield law
provisions and terminology. 39 No two states have identical statutes privileging
the identity of a newsman's confidential source. These statutes can be compared,
however, by examining the persons privileged, the nature of the material
privileged, and the scope of the privilege given.
Persons Privileged
To effectively include newsmen within their provisions, shield laws must
attempt to specify the numerous individuals working in various capacities in
a wide range of media, who gather and disseminate news and information to
the public. Unfortunately, unlike lawyers and doctors who have also been
granted statutory privileges, journalists are not licensed by the state, so no
easy method is available for defining the class to which the privilege is to be
accorded. Thus, legislatures have had to explicitly define both the media and
the personnel within those media who are embraced by their statutory testimonial
privileges.
33. Ala. Code tit. 12, § 12-21-142 (1977); Alaska Stat. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (1973); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12-2237 (West Supp. 1978); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-917 (1977); Cal. Evid. Code § 1070 (West Supp.
1979); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 4320-26 (1975); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 51, §§ 111-119 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1978); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1978); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 421.100 (1978); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 45:1451-54 (West Supp. 1978); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-112 (1974);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 767.5a (1968); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1978);
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 93-601-1, 2 (1964 and Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 20-144 to 147
(1977); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 49.275 (1977); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:84A-21, 21a, 29 (West 1976 and
Supp. 1978); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (McKinney 1976); N.D. Cent. Code § 31-01-06.2 (1976);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2739.04, .11, .12 (1954 and Page Supp. 1979); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §
2506 (West Supp. 1978); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 44.510-.540 (1977); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 5942 (Purdon
1978); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 9-19.1-1 to 3 (Supp. 1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-113 to 115 (Supp.
1978). N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12.1 (1953 Comp.), 1967 N.M. Laws, was declared unconstitutional
in Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976) and subsequently
dropped from statute books when they were recodified in 1978.
For an excellent summary of newsman's privilege legislation, see Council of State Governments,
Shield Laws, (1973).
34. Delaware, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon and Tennessee. It should be noted
that 19 states had enacted shield laws at the time of the Branzburg decision, not 17 as stated in the
court's opinion. 408 U.S. at 689. This error, which excluded the Illinois and Rhode Island statutes
passed in 1971, has been incorrectly cited again in numerous articles. See, e.g., 66 Geo. L.J.,
supra note 18, at 1274.
35. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 4320-26 (1975).
36. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 93-601-1,2 (1964 and Supp. 1977).
37. Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 595.021-.025 (West Supp. 1978) and Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 20-144 to 147 (1977).
38. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.022 (West Supp. 1978).
39. Variations in shield laws result as much from the respective age of the statutes as from differing
policy considerations.
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1. Media Requirements
In demarcating the media included within their statutory provisions, most
of the 25 states presently offering statutory shields have recognized the wide
range of media by which information and news are conveyed to the
public. 40 Oregon is a good example. Its statute covers any "medium of
communication" which "includes, but is not limited to, any newspaper, magazine
or other periodical, book, pamphlet, news service, wire service, news or feature
syndicate, broadcast station or network, or cable television system. ' 41 Other
states, concerned that even such extensive listings of media may prove too
limiting, use all-inclusive terms for the media within their statutory protection.
For example, Delaware protects any media which has "facilities for the mass
reproduction of words, sounds, or images in a form available to the general
public."' 42 Some states have enacted stricter requirements for statutory coverage.
Nine states restrict their testimonial privilege to the established press, as
opposed to the underground press, by including language within their statutes
to the effect that newspapers and periodicals "must be issued at regular
intervals and have a paid general circulation. ' 43 New York, New Jersey, Ohio
and Pennsylvania stipulate even more rigid formalities in their statutes.44
2. Occupational Requirements
The various state shield laws also restrict the individuals protected within
each medium. One approach used by many states is to define the relationship
between the media and the persons privileged. Alabama follows this format.
It states, "No person engaged in, connected with, or employed by any [stipulated
40. 23 of the 25 states include the traditional broadcast and print media within their statutes - newspapers,
radio stations, and television. Ala. Code tit. 12, § 12-21-142 (1977), Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2237
(West Supp. 1978), and Ky. Rev. Stat. § 421.100 (1978) restrict protection exclusively to these
traditional media, while the 21 other states include at least journals or periodicals as well. Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 43-917 (1977) and Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 767.5a (1968) are unique: Arkansas includes
newspapers, periodicals, and radio stations within the ambit of its statute, but excludes television
stations, while Michigan only provides for "reporters of newspapers and other publications", both
indicating the antiquity of their statutes in this age of the electronic media.
41. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 44.510 (1977).
42. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4320 (1975). Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.023 (West Supp. 1978) includes media
"for the purposes of transmission, dissemination or publication to the public." Tenn. Code Ann. §
24-113 (Supp. 1978) says only "news media or press." N.D. Cent. Code § 31-01-06.2 (1976) includes
"any organization engaged in publishing or broadcasting news." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-21 (West
Supp. 1978) grants protection to any media "for the purpose of gathering, procuring, transmitting,
compiling, editing or disseminating of news for the general public."
43. Alaska, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 5942 (Purdon 1978) requires only "general circulation." Alaska Stat. §
09.25.150 (1973) and Ind. Code Ann. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1978) do not require a "paid" general
circulation. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2739.11 (Page 1954) only stipulates that newspapers have been
sold or offered for sale.
Apparently the rationale is that the professional press is primarily responsible for the continuing
process of procurement and dispersement of conventional news to the public and therefore the privilege
should be restricted to them.
44. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (McKinney 1976) and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-21a (West Supp.
1978) state "'Newspaper' shall mean a paper that is printed and distributed ordinarily not less
frequently than once a week, and has done so for at least one year, and that contains news, articles
of opinion (as editorials), features, advertising, or other matter regarded as of current interest, has a
paid circulation and has been entered at United States post-office as second-class matter."
Circulation requirements that are too arbitrary may be repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution. See D'Alemberte, supra note 12, at 225.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-21 (West Supp. 1978), Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2739.04 (Page Supp.
1979), and Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 5942 (Purdon 1978) also require the broadcast media to maintain
for public inspection a record of the information whose source they wish to privilege. This provision,
though, appears to be aimed more at guaranteeing access to previously broadcast information than
attempting to limit the media covered.
Reporter's Shield Laws
media] . . . shall be compelled to disclose . . . ,,45 Other states simply list
the individuals protected under the statute. The Oklahoma statute provides,
"any man or woman who is a reporter, photographer, editor, commentator,
journalist, correspondent, announcer, or other individual regularly engaged
in . . . preparing news," is within its ambit. 46 A third method is to specify
the functions of the persons covered by the statute. Illinois uses the following
approach: "Reporter means any person regularly engaged in the business of
collecting, writing or editing news for publication through a news medium;
and includes any person who was a reporter at the time the information sought
was procured or obtained. '47
Illinois' definition, cited above, also includes former newsmen. Eleven other
states also indicate that their statutory protection derives from the individual's
employment at the time the information is provided by confidential sources,
rather than at the time of the requested disclosure. 48 Also, although most
states require that a reporter be regularly engaged in newsgathering to qualify
for the privilege, Tennessee and Indiana have drafted their statutory provisions
to explicitly include independent freelance reporters who might collect or
disseminate information through a media. 49
An additional concern of some states is that shield laws will be used to
conceal information acquired by a reporter when he is acting in his capacity
as an ordinary citizen rather than in his professional newsgathering function.
At least 16 states, therefore, have chosen to specifically limit legislative
safeguards against compelled disclosure to sources of information obtained by
a newsman "in the course of his employment" or "while engaged in a
newsgathering capacity." 50
The Nature of the Privilege
Shield laws also vary as to the information privileged from compelled
disclosure. States have split over whether the identity of the confidential source
should be privileged from divulgence, or if shield laws should protect the
content of confidential unpublished information imparted as well. Eleven states
privilege "the source of any information procured or obtained" by a newsman,
45. Ala. Code tit. 12, § 12-21-142 (1977).
46. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2506 (West Supp. 1978). Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4320 (1975) is quite
specific as to who is a newsman: an individual who "in each of the preceding three weeks or four of
the preceding eight weeks had spent at least 20 hours engaged in the practice of obtaining or preparing
information for dissemination."
47. III. Ann. Stat. ch. 51, § 112 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
48. Alaska, California, Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North
Dakota, and Oregon.
49. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1978); Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-113 (Supp. 1978).
50. Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Rhode Island. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §
4320 (1975) and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-21a (West Supp. 1978) include identical definitions: .'In
the course of pursuing his professional activities' means any situation, including a social gathering, in
which a reporter obtains information for the purpose of disseminating it to the public, but does not
include any situation in which a reporter intentionally conceals from the source the fact that he is a
reporter, and does not include any situation in which a reporter is an eyewitness to, or participant
in, any act involving physical violence or property damage." Maryland case law has implied this
requirement. Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, affd 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212
(1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973). Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4322 (1975) additionally requires
an express or implied understanding between the reporter and the source that the information would
not be disclosed or that disclosure would hinder the source relationship.
19791
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thus privileging only the identity of the informant. 51 Fourteen states, however,
have also chosen to privilege the unpublished confidential communication
between the reporter and the informant by providing, "any information or
the source of any information procured or obtained" is protected. 52 These
states reflect the modern concern that revealing the confidential content of an
unpublished communication may lead to the identity of the source or dissuade
him from informing again, thus defeating the very purpose behind shield laws.
Additionally, although many statutes clearly indicate to the contrary, four
states grant protection only to sources whose information is later actually
published or disseminated. 53 Another five states merely require that the
information at least be procured or used for publication. 54 The apparent
rationale behind these nine statutes is that for reporter/source relationships to
serve society, the information they produce must reach the public.
The Scope of the Privilege
A third element of the statutory protection given newsmen is the scope of
the privilege conferred. A majority of 14 states grant newsmen an absolute
privilege of nondisclosure; 55 that is, once a journalist is determined to be within
the technical confines of the statute, he has an unqualified right to withhold
the privileged information. Generally, a blanket privilege to refuse to disclose
the identity of an informant at all times and under all circumstances is given.
Nine states grant only a qualified privilege which may be pre-empted if
a court determines that society's interest in a reporter's testimony outweighs
the first amendment interest in keeping sources or unpublished information
confidential. 56 For example, Minnesota and Tennessee use the test propounded
by Justice Stewart in his dissent in Branzburg as the standard regulating
divestiture of the privilege.57 Under these two statutes, disclosure may be
compelled if (1) the information is clearly relevant to the proceeding; (2) it
cannot be obtained through alternative means; and (3) there is a compelling
and overriding public interest in the information. 58 The remaining seven states
51. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4320 (1975) indicates third-party sources are not included by
the term "source". At least La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:1452 (West Supp. 1978), Minn. Stat. Ann. §
595.023 (West Supp. 1978), and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-21 (West Supp. 1978), however, specifically
indicate their statutes envelop sources not directly contacted by newsmen.
52. California, Delaware, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 767.5a (1968) simply
declares that "communications between reporters . . . and their informants are to be privileged and
confidential". Although technically privileging only confidential information, the statute would probably
be broadly interpreted to protect the identity of journalistic confidential sources as well. The drafting
deficiency results because the Michigan shield provision is part of a general statute also granting the
privilege to attorneys, clergymen, and physicians.
53. Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Maryland.
54. Arizona, California, Nebraska, New York, and Tennessee. However, because not every lead results in
a story and because of the subtle issues of intent which must be answered, both limitations appear
unfounded.
55. Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4323 (1975) is unique in
that it grants an absolute privilege regaiding the identity of the source, but a qualified privilege as
to the content of the information. Confidential information may be ordered disclosed if it would not
tend to identify the person or means through which the information was obtained and the public
interest warrants making the information public.
56. Alaska, Arkansas, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.
57. Supra note 31.
58. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.024 (West Supp. 1978); Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-113 (Supp. 1978).
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use similar but even more general standards for permitting divestiture of the
privilege protecting the confidentiality of news sources. 59
California and New York are unique in that they give newsmen protection
from testifying as to their sources in a totally different manner. Both provide
immunity to newsmen from being found in contempt of court for refusing to
disclose confidential sources and information; 60 they do not create a privilege
in a positive sense.61 This effectively takes away the courts' most potent power
of enforcement through contempt citations, but it apparently would not prevent
the use of other sanctions for the refusal of a reporter to disclose his sources
such as obstruction of justice charges, use of discovery penalties, or directed
libel verdicts. 62
Additional Shield Law Provisions
State shield laws apply to any body having the power to compel testimony
or the production of evidence, either from the statutory language itself or
through judicial decisions. Courts have broadly interpreted these statutes to
extend to any stage of any administrative, legislative and judicial proceeding
before any officer. 63 Only a few states establish the mechanics for challenging
the assertion of the privilege,64 since the majority of states that have enacted
shield laws grant an absolute privilege against disclosure of a newsman's source
of information. Statutes with qualifying circumstances usually contain an
application procedure for initiating divestiture of the privilege, while providing
59. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2506 (West Supp. 1978) requires that "such information or identity is
relevant to a significant issue in the action and could not with due diligence be obtained by alternative
means." Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 51, §§ 116, 117 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) permits testimony when there
are no alternative sources and the "public interest" is involved and stipulates the considerations which
go into such a finding: "the nature of the proceeding, the merits of the claim or defense, the adequacy
of the remedy otherwise available, the relevancy of the source, and the availability of other sources."
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:1453 (West Supp. 1978) is even less strict, allowing compelled disclosure
simply when it is "essential to the public interest". Alaska Stat. § 09.25.160 (1973) does not allow
the withholding of testimony if it would be contrary to the public interest or result in the miscarriage
of justice and. denial of a fair trial. N.D. Cent. Code § 31-01-06.2 (1976) compels disclosure only
when there would be "a miscarriage of justice." R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-19.1-1 (Supp. 1979) provides
that for disclosure, the interrogating party must show the information is necessary to permit criminal
prosecution of a specific felony or to prevent a threat to human life, and that there are no alternative
sources. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-917 (1977) is totally different in that it bases the granting of a privilege
on the motive and content of a newsman's published articles. For the testimonial privilege to be
inapplicable, "it must be shown that such article was written, published or broadcast in bad faith,
with malice, and not in the interest of the public welfare."
60. Cal. Evid. Code § 1070 (West Supp. 1979) provides that a newsman "cannot be adjudged in contempt
by a judicial, legislative, administrative body, or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas,
for refusing to disclose. ... N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h (McKinney 1976) states that no journalist
"shall be adjudged in contempt by any court, the legislature or other body having contempt Powers,
nor shall a grand jury seek to have a journalist or newscaster held in contempt by any court, legislature
or other body having contempt powers for refusing or failing to disclose .... "
61. See Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1977); People v. Monroe, 82 Misc.
2d 850, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1975); Comment to Cal. Evid. Code §1070 (West Supp. 1979) by
California Assembly Committee on the Judiciary.
62. Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 93-601-2 (Supp. 1977) combines the privilege and immunity approaches.
It provides double protection for journalists against compelled disclosure of sources by both granting
an absolute testimonial privilege and also removing the courts' power to penalize an invocation of that
privilege.
63. See, e.g., Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Printing & Publishing, 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (1964),
which held that shield privileges were applicable to discovery proceedings.
64. Alaska, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.
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the right of appeal from any order compelling disclosure and an automatic
stay of the order pending the appeal. Five states' shield laws deal expressly
with waivers of a reporter's privilege not to disclose his news sources.65
Additionally, seven states have chosen to make reporters' shield laws
inapplicable to defamation actions in which a reporter or news medium is the
party defendant. 66 Most of these have merely added the defamation limitation
to their already qualified statutes. Practical considerations are apparently
present for this exclusion. The Supreme Court in New York Times v.
Sullivan erected a high threshold of evidence in order to survive a directed
verdict in a libel or slander action against the media. 67 In this type of action,
the reliability of the source of the disputed publication may well be a pivotal
evidentiary point. Thus, a privilege for journalists not to disclose sources or
information may well block recovery for defamation in some instances.
State Shield Laws: A Summary
As we have seen, an analysis of the reporters' shield law situation today
shows that the statutory protections offered the reporter and his source are
uneven, uncertain and not widely available. Among the states, a bare majority
of 26 legislatures have granted some sort of protection to journalists' confidential
sources, and an analysis shows even this figure is misleading.
One state's shield law has been declared constitutionally invalid.68 Of the
remaining 25 states having shield laws privileging a reporter's sources from
being divulged, only 14 actually give newsmen an absolute privilege. 69 Two
states offer absolute protection against contempt penalties, but leave open the
possibility of other sanctions. 70 Nine statutes grant a qualified privilege
7
'
---dependent on courts' discretionary senses of justice and public welfare. In
a sense, in these nine states the term "shield law" might well be a misnomer
when one considers that the asserted reason for enacting shield laws was to
take protection of news informants' identities out of the' hands of judges.
Additionally, the ad hoc nature of these conditional privilege statutes re-establishes
the chilling effect by interjecting uncertainty and unpredictability into the
confidential relationship.
65. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-29 (West 1976) provides that a newsman's right to the statutory privilege
is waived if he voluntarily discloses any part of the privileged material. Or. Rev. Stat. § 44.530 (1977)
applies regardless of whether a journalist has disclosed any of the information elsewhere. Mont. Rev.
Codes Ann. § 93-601-2 (Supp. 1977) on the other hand, stipulates that "dissemination . . . in whole
or in part does not constitute a waiver . " of the testimonial privilege. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §
4325 (1975) states that a reporter may be cross-examined only on the facts which he has waived by
disclosure. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-19.1-3 (Supp. 1979) has a similar provision that the privilege does not
apply to any information which has been made public by the person claiming the privilege.
66. Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 45:1454 (West Supp. 1978) provides that in defamation actions in which the defense is based on
a confidential source of information, the reporter or news medium has the burden of proof to sustain
a defense of good faith. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.024 (West Supp. 1978) states that the confidential
source must be relevant to the issue of defamation and the information cannot be obtained by any
alternate means less destructive of first amendment rights. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-19.1-2 (Supp. 1979)
also excludes proceedings regarded to be secret from statutory protection, such as grand juries.
67. See note 23 supra. The court held that a public official could not recover damages in a civil action
for libel unless he could prove actual malice.
68. New Mexico. See note 33 supra.
69. See note 55 supra.
70. See notes 60 and 61 supra and accompanying text.
71. See note 56 supra.
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Further analysis shows that in the 14 states which provide an absolute
privilege, only six apply the privilege both to the source of information and
the information itself.72 Seven states apply the privilege to the protection only
of sources, 73 and one state specifically applies it only to the -information
itself.74 Of the six states which do provide a strong extensive privilege, Oregon
does not allow the privilege to be asserted in defamation proceedings.
Not all news personnel are protected by the statutory privileges. Many
state statutes restrict their protection only to certain specified media, while
nine states expressly include only the professional press.75 Some legislatures
have not extended protection to former newsmen, freelancers, confidential
information which was not a basis for a disseminated story, information which
was obtained when the journalist was not expressly acting in his professional
capacity, or sources whose confidential information has been partially disclosed.
In short, a testimonial privilege in favor of newsmen in the 50 states and
federal courts is as much the exception today as the rule, and even in the
jurisdictions where available, the privilege granted may be quite limited.
THE JUDICIARY'S RESPONSE TO SHIELD LAWS
Judicial decisions applying shield laws have had as important an effect in
determining the legislative testimonial privilege available to newsmen as the
statutory provisions themselves. Traditionally unhappy about evidentiary privileges
which limit judicial access to information, courts have tended to construe shield
laws narrowly 76 thus eroding the already frail testimonial privilege available
to journalists. Judicial decisions are replete with instances of implied statutory
waiver 77 and restrictive definitions of "news media" 78 and "sources." ' 79 Courts
have placed the burden on newsmen to establish that they fall under the
statutory privilege.80 They have held that shield laws afford protection only
when the information is received under a strictly construed and obvious cloak
72. Delaware, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, and Oregon.
73. Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
74. Michigan. Although the shield law could be interpreted to apply to sources as well. See note 52
supra.
75. See note 43 supra.
76. Courts rested such holdings on the belief that shield laws, as obstacles to the administration of justice
and the search for truth in derogation of common law, should not be construed broader than absolutely
required. See, e.g., Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d affd 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212
(1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973); Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Printing and Publishing, 82 N.J.
Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (1964); Andrews v. Andreoli, 92 Misc. 2d 410, 400 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1977).
But, contra, In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963); Ex parte Howard, 136 Cal. App. 2d
816, 289 P.2d 537 (1955).
77. See, e.g., In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3, affd 62 N.J. 80, 299 A.2d 78 (1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973), in which statutory protection was held waived merely by disclosure
of any part of the privileged material; Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473
(1956) in which the court held that a newspaper had waived its statutory privilege in a libel suit
when the defense it set forth was good faith and fair comment.
78. See, e.g., Deltec, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ohio 1960), in which
bimonthly financial report was held not a newspaper within the statutory meaning; In re Cepeda,
233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), in which the court ruled the use of the term "newspaper" in the
statute was not comprehensive and thereby excluded magazines from the shield of the statute.
79. See, e.g., State v. Donovan, 129 N.J. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (1943), in which a statute privileging the
source of information was held not to protect the name of a messenger who delivered an article; State
v. Sheridan, 248 Md. 320, 236 A.2d 18 (1967), in which the privilege of the "source of any news
or information" was held not to include the "news or information" itself; Branzburg v. Pound, 461
S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971), affd 408 U.S. 665 (1972), in which the court held that where a newsman
personally observes persons committing criminal activities, the newsman and not the persons observed
is the "source" of the news or information in the sense contemplated by statute.
80. See, e.g., People v. Wolf, 69 Misc. 2d 256, 329 N.Y.S.2d 291, affd 39 A.D. 2d 864, 333 N.Y.S.2d
299 (1972).
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of confidentiality. 8 1 Through such rigid interpretations, courts continue to
successfully circumvent legislative intent and curtail shield law protection. 82
Although the statutory privilege granted by legislatures to newsmen in shield
statutes has often been circumvented by the judiciary, the constitutionality of
the privilege was rarely questioned and never denied.8 3 Recent state court
decisions indicate, however, that an absolute shield for reporters may, in certain
settings, be constitutionally suspect. In both the sixth amendment8 4 and the
separation of powers 85 areas, the continued vitality of state shield laws has
been drawn into question.
The very concept of shield law legislation and its application to the
courtroom has been found unconstitutional in New Mexico under the separation
of powers principle as an invasion of the judiciary's constitutionally defined
sphere of power. In Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 86 a reporter
refused to disclose his sources in a civil action for libel, citing New Mexico's
shield statute. Although the statute was qualified and substantially discretionary
on the part of the court since it permitted disclosure whenever "essential to
prevent injustice," the New Mexico Supreme Court determined the state shield
law to be a rule of evidence and therefore procedural in nature and a part
of the judicial machinery for resolving substantive rights. As such, the statute
was an unconstitutional encroachment on the state judiciary's exclusive authority
over rules of pleading, practice, and procedure.8 7
Although first glance indicates that such a fundamental constitutional
infirmity would seem to leave no room for a legislative testimonial privilege
for reporters, closer scrutiny of the opinion reveals a much more circumscribed
if not negligible impact on shield law legislation. Unlike New Mexico, many
state constitutions do not empower the judiciary with exclusive rulemaking
power over court procedure.88 Even in those that do, legislatively created
procedural rules are not unconstitutional per se, but may be enforced by the
judiciary out of respect for the actions of a co-equal branch,8 9 as other state
courts with constitutions similar to New Mexico's have done. Additionally, the
line between substance and procedure is hazy,90 particularly in classifying
testimonial privileges. The New Mexico court may have been too hasty in
81. See, e.g., People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 791, 388 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1976), in which material obtained
by a newsman was held not to be intended by the informant to be confidential; In re WBAI-FM,68
Misc. 2d 355, 326 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1971), in which the court found the contents of a letter made
available to the public by a radio station to have no cloak of confidentiality.
82. Judicial hostility toward reporters' shield laws as evidenced by narrow construction continues to the
present. Just recently a Montana court held that although reporters are protected by the state's shield
statute, news organizations such as the Associated Press are not. Quill, November 1978, at 6.
83. The only case to raise a constitutional issue until the 1970's was Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351
(N.D. Ala. 1953). The court ruled that Alabama's shield law was not unconstitutional when measured
by the test of the fourteenth amendment.
84. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the Witness
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . U.S. Const. amend.
vi.
85. Under the separation of powers concept, no branch of government is constitutionally permitted to
exercise power in a sphere belonging to another or to interfere with the others' administration of
powers so as to impair its basic function in the constitutional scheme. 66 Geo. L.J., supra note 18,
at 1279.
86. 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976).
87. Id. at 309-310, 551 P.2d at 1356-57.
88. There are generally three variations among states as to the delegation of rule-making authority. Some
states give the judiciary exclusive rule-making power, while others grant the power subject to legislative
modification or annulment. Other states grant the legislature power to regulate constitutional procedure.
66 Geo. L.J., supra note 18, at 1280-1281, n. 45, 48.
89. Id. at 1281.
90. See. e.g., Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99 (1945).
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labeling privilege statutes procedural, for at least one commentator, after a
thorough analysis, has convincingly argued that shield laws, while having some
procedural effects, are basically substantive in nature.91
A less sweeping but more serious challenge to shield laws has been mounted
by California courts under the second provision of the separation of powers
doctrine, i.e., the prohibition against impinging upon another branch of
government's basic functional integrity. In Farr v. Superior Court92 a
California journalist was cited for contempt for refusing to disclose the source
of a statement released in violation of a court-imposed gag order to guarantee
a fair trial during the Manson murder proceedings. The citation was enforced
despite California's shield law which specifically prohibited contempt citations
of newsmen who refused to disclose their confidential sources or information.
The appellate court, in upholding the contempt conviction, disagreed with the
reporter's assertion that the California shield law protected the confidentiality
of his news sources. The court held that the shield law granting immunity
from contempt in such a situation was "an unconstitutional interference by
the legislative branch with an inherent and vital power of the court to control
its own proceedings and officers," and was therefore invalid as a violation of
the separation of powers doctrine.93
The Farr decision was further defined in the subsequent California decision
of Rosato v. Superior Court. 94 The case again involved a contempt citation
against a reporter for failing to answer questions during an investigation of
the violation of a judicial gag order designed to protect a criminal defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial. Quoting extensively from the Farr opinion,
the court again reaffirmed the inherent constitutional power of the judiciary
to control the conduct of those subjected to a gag order, but indicated that
California's absolute immunity statute, rather than being totally invalid, was
merely constitutionally circumscribed. The Rosato court additionally limited
the Farr decision by holding that the judiciary's inherent power to compel
disclosure of sources extended only to court officers.
These California decisions regarding shield laws are particularly significant
because they not only appear to be valid constitutional objections to legislative
limitations on an essential judicial power, but also raise questions as to their
application to more conventional shield laws. Statutes granting a true privilege
to newsmen not to reveal their sources appear to be subject to the same
constitutional defect of hampering judicial investigations, thus similarly
encroaching on a court's inherent constitutional power to protect the integrity
of its own processes.
91. 66 Geo. L.J., supra note 18, at 1283-1285. A substantive right, which is independent of court
proceedings, is created and defined on behalf of the reporter, although it has an incidental effect on
those proceedings.
92. 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1971), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1011 (1972). People v. Monroe,
82 Misc. 2d 850, 370 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1975), decided on other grounds, later cited Farr and suggested
that New York's shield law, which also restricted the use of the contempt power against news reporters,
might violate the separation of powers.
93. Id. at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348. Farr was also unusual in that first amendment interest in the free
flow of information was missing, while conversely there was a sixth amendment fair trial interest in
keeping the information secret.
94. 51 Cal. App. 3rd 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied. 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
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The recent Farber case represents the leading decision in the conflict
between shield statutes and sixth amendment guarantees. 95 In their decision
affirming Farber's contempt convictions for refusing to turn over notes relating
to his sources in a criminal trial, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the
protections afforded Farber by the New Jersey Newspaperman's Privilege Law,
which it characterized as one "as strongly worded as any in the country." 96
Notwithstanding the intent and purpose of the New Jersey statute, the court
ruled that the shield law must give way to a defendant's sixth amendment
right to a fair and impartial trial.97
In holding that this constitutional provision guarantees criminal defendants
the right to compel attendance of witnesses and production of documents, the
court did acknowledge its obligation to give as much effect as possible to the
legislature's purpose of establishing a strong testimonial privilege for news-
men. 98 The court prescribed the imposition of safeguards which required strict
showings "that there was a reasonable probability or likelihood that the
information sought by the subpoena was material and relevant to the defense,
that it could not be secured from any less intrusive source, and that the
defendant had a legitimate need to see and otherwise use it" before disclosure
could be ordered. 99 In camera inspection could be used as a procedural tool
in this determination.
The resolution in Farber of the conflict between shield laws and the sixth
amendment certainly indicates there may be additional constitutional restraints
on shield law legislation. 100 Much as the judiciary has the duty and authority
95.. See note 1 supra. The case grew out of a series of articles which New York Times reporter Myron
Farber wrote in early 1976 about 13 mysterious deaths involving a "Dr. X" that had occurred 10
years before in a New Jersey hospital. Farber's information prompted authorities to reopen the
investigation and eventually indict Dr. Mario E. Jascalevich on murder charges. The doctor's defense
lawyer demanded to see Farber's notes, insisting they were vital to his case, but Farber refused, citing
the first amendment and the New Jersey shield law that gave reporters an absolute privilege to keep
their sources and unpublished information confidential. A New Jersey judge asked to see the notes in
private to determine their relevancy, but Farber still refused. Farber was cited for contempt and
imprisoned. 78 N.J. at 263-264, 278-281, 394 A.2d at 332, 339-340.
In an earlier case, U.S. v. Homer, 411 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Pa.), affd 545 F.2d 864 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied 431 U.S. 954 (1977), a federal district court had simply stated without further
comment that Pennsylvania's Newspaper Reporters Privilege Act should not be permitted to stand in
the way where the inquiry goes to the heart of the matter in a criminal case in federal court. The
material sought to be disclosed was found to be irrelevant and immaterial to the case.
The Rosato decision also commented that "any doctrinal tension between the First Amendment
and the Sixth Amendment resulting in an impasse must be resolved in favor of the relatively unrestricted
constitutional right to a fair trial rather than in favor of the relatively limited invasion on freedom
of the press caused by the necessity of revealing a relatively restricted category of news sources." 51
Cal. App. 3d at 223, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 449. Contra, Shindler v. State, 49 Ind. Dec. 182, 335 N.E.
2d 638 (1975). "The State does not have the right, in the face of the [shield] statute, to require [the
reporter] to give [criminal defendants] the names of . .. sources." Id. at 192, 335 N.E.2d at 646.
96. 78 N.J. at 270, 394 A.2d at 335.
97. Id. at 271-272, 394 A.2d at 336. "The Federal and State Constitutions each provide that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 'to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor.' Dr. Jascalevich seeks to obtain evidence to use in preparing and presenting
his defense in the ongoing criminal trial ... [W]hen faced with the Shield Law, he invokes the rather
elementary but entirely sound proposition that where Constitution and statute collide, the latter must
yield . . . . We find this argument unassailable." Id.
98. Id. at 270, 394 A.2d at 335.
99. Id. at 276-277, 394 A.2d at 338.
100. The Farber precedent has already been bolstered. In Hammarley v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3rd
388, _ Cal. Rptr. _ (1979), the California Court of Appeals, in a factual situation reminiscent of
Farber, upheld a contempt citation against reporter John Hammarley of the Los Angeles Herald
Examiner for refusing to turn over his subpoenaed notes and tapes relating to a murder trial for in
camera inspection. The court ruled that although all unpublished information obtained from a news
source was privileged by the state's shield law, in the circumstances before it, the statute's first
amendement interests were present only as "an abstraction", and thus had to give way to the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process of all relevant and otherwise unavailable information
necessary for a fair trial. The case is now on appeal.
Reporter's Shield Laws
to protect its own constitutionally ordained role as in Farr, it has the
obligation and power to protect the rights and interests of individual citizens
as well. Despite the constitutional limitations suggested by the New Jersey
and California decisions, however, shield law legislation has still emerged as
a proper, viable and constitutional instrument for establishing a testimonial
privilege for newsmen.
SHIELD LAW LEGISLATION: TOWARD A MORE HOPEFUL FUTURE
In spite of their own inherent weaknesses, an unfriendly reception by the
judiciary, and constitutional restraints, shield laws remain of paramount
importance to the efforts of newsmen to gain a testimonial privilege regarding
their confidential sources. Outside of scattered and limited judicial protection
in non-criminal proceedings, 101 shield statutes offer the only significant basis
for a privilege in favor of journalists today. In retrospect, there is much to
indicate that the judiciary has been unjustifiably hostile and suspicious in
refusing to implement the polic'y judgment of the legislature as embodied in
shield laws. Courts have apparently failed to consider a number of salient
points relating to shield laws.
First, shield laws are the product of a co-equal branch of the tripartite
governmental structure and must be respected as such. The creation of an
absolute privilege involves a policy judgment by the legislature that the public
interest in the free flow of information outweighs all other competing interests
and rights. Under the separation of powers principle, courts should respect
and implement legislative judgments to the maximum extent possible unless a
constitutional standard clearly conflicts. Only then, with great hesitation and
reluctance, and after exhausting other possible alternatives, should the judiciary
invalidate an act of the legislature. Failure to implement legislative intent
results in policymaking by courts, a function beyond the constitutional power
of the judiciary.
Secondly, the pre-eminence of the first amendment within our constitutional
scheme mandates much stronger judicial support for a statutory testimonial
privilege for the press. The fundamental rationale behind the passage of shield
laws is to effectively extend first amendment newsgathering protection to a
reporter's confidential sources, which courts have failed to do under
federal and state constitutions. 102 As noted earlier, five of nine justices in
Branzburg believed a newsman's sources were afforded protection under the
first amendment, although Justice Powell did not believe it controlled in the
instant grand jury situation. 103 Some lower courts, in spite of Branzburg, have
recognized limited constitutional protection of news source identities in civil
proceedings. 104 The fact that legislatures are attempting to expand a fundamental
101. Lower courts have increasingly limited the force of Branzburg by recognizing a first amendment
interest in the nondisclosure of a journalist's confidential sources, and, at least in civil cases, often
found that countervailing interests were not enough to overcome the qualified first amendment privilege.
See e.g., Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966
(1973); Democratic National Committee v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973); Apicella v.
McNeil Laboratories, 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
102. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-144 (1977) "The Legislature finds: . . . That [this act] is necessary
to ensure the free flow of information and to implement the first and fourth amendments and Article
I, section 8, of the United States Constitution, and the Nebraska Constitution."
103. Even Justice White, writing for the majority, apparently believed the proposition had enough merit
to invite state legislatures, state courts, and Congress to make their own determinations. 408 U.S. at
693. See note 28 supra.
104. Supra note 101.
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constitutional right by statute suggests that courts would begin with a presumption
of a first amendment privilege and then entertain justification for denying it,
rather than the opposite method now being employed. 105
The reporter-source relationship also fits the classic test for privileges which,
by their very nature, limit the search for truth and result in injustice, yet are
deemed necessary in the best interest of society. 106 Branzburg itself reaffirmed
"the long-standing principle that the public . . .has a right to every man's
evidence', except for those persons protected by a constitutional, common law,
or statutory privilege. ",107 The Court only denied a constitutional privilege; it
did not invalidate a statutory one. In fact, it openly suggested a statutory
testimonial privilege for newsmen. Privileges are specific exceptions to the sixth
amendment's power to compel testimony as well. Compulsory process has never
been absolute. The fourth and fifth amendment as well as statutory and
common law privileges, already circumscribe the duty to testify in criminal
trials. These amendments are absolute and are not balanced against constitutional
rights. Unless only shield laws for journalists are destined to be overcome by
the sixth amendment, the legislature's judgment, that the confidentiality of
news sources promoting freedom of information is more important to the proper
functioning of society and the public welfare than the ability of crim-
inal defendants to gain access to all sources of information, should be
honored. 108
Lastly, additional grounds have recently emerged which lend credence to
the extension of protection to confidential sources by legislatures. Newsmen
have increasingly complained that they are being subpoenaed before grand
juries for use as an investigative arm of the government or as a means for
discovering the identity of, and retaliating against, politically embarrassing
sources. 109 Justices White and Powell both cautioned that harassment of the
press through the use of judicial subpoenas would not be tolerated. 110 Increasing
indications of harassment may well influence future cases. In addition, public
support for protection of a newsman's source has grown, not diminished, since
the Branzburg decision. I1 l Although most states had not enacted shield laws
at the time Branzburg was decided, a factor duly noted by the Court, a
majority of state legislatures have now granted newsmen an evidentiary
privilege. 112 Additionally, the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize a testimonial
105. See also, Guest and Stanzler, supra note 18, at 38.
106. Privileges, whether statutory or common law, are recognized because confidentiality is essential to the
maintenance of the relationship between the two parties, and the prospective injury to that relationship
from compelled disclosure outweighs the consequent public benefit in the ascertainment of truth. This
applies equally to the reporter-source relationship.
107. 408 U.S. at 688 (emphasis added).
108. Another alternative might be to simply dismiss the charges against a criminal defendant when a
confidential source is vital to his defense, thus protecting the sixth amendment rights of the accused
while rendering proper respect to the legislatures' policy decision as well.
109. Time, October 30, 1978 at 66. The Washington-based Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press
estimated that in the period 1960-1969 only about 12 reporters were subpoenaed, while approximately
150 were subpoenaed in 1969-1970, and over 500 in the period from 1970-1976 after which subpoenas
became too numerous to count. Telephone interview with Brona Pinnolis, Reporter's Committee for
Freedom of the Press (Nov. 1, 1978). The high number of subpoenas in 1969'70 was the result of
the Nixon Administration's vigorous prosecution of left-wing anti-war activists about whom newsmen
had collected much information in the process of reporting the news. 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rev., supra note
8, at 162. Ironically, if reporters become perceived as extensions of the government by their sources,
the net effect will be their becoming of little use to law enforcement.
110. 408 U.S. at 707-710.
111. A fall 1978 Gallup poll indicates that Americans now support a reporter's right to protect his
confidential sources by a margin of three to one, an increase over similar surveys in 1972 and 1973.
Gallop Opinion Index, 163, Feb. 1979.
112. 408 U.S. at 689.
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privilege for newsmen and the increasing use of contempt penalties have not
been successful in forcing most reporters to divulge their confidential sources.
It is doubtful whether these considerations carry enough weight to override
other conflicting constitutional interests and cause the Supreme Court to uphold
absolute shield laws for reporters. Branzburg indicates that there is no consistent
view of the first amendment embraced by a clear majority of the present
Court. With such significant factors in its favor, however, shield law legislation
should hopefully receive increased judicial support in the future.
CONCLUSION
Legislatures today provide very little protection to the newsman trying to
protect the confidentiality of his sources. Only a bare majority of states have
shield provisions; the trend toward more states enacting such statutes appears
to have ended about two years after Branzburg. Federal law provides no
privilege against disclosure of confidential sources for newsmen, and the
possibility of future federal legislation is unpredictable at best. Poor draftsmanship,
qualifications within the statutes themselves, and narrow judicial construction
effectively limit the privilege shield laws Offer and create uncertainty and
unpredictability for informants in their confidentiality. Recent court decisions
rejecting the privilege on constitutional grounds have challenged even the ability
of legislative bodies to provide an absolute testimonial privilege. A tremendous
amount of uncertainty exists as to how much protection legislatures actually
can afford confidential news sources. It is clear, however, that in light of an
express legislative policy to protect confidential sources, the judiciary should
give the maximum effect possible to statutory testimonial privileges for reporters.
With such an approach, all constitutionally-based interests-first amendment,
sixth amendment, and separation of powers-would receive fuller implementation.
If Congress and the states wish to establish a privilege for newsmen, they
should continue to strive to enact strong, well-drafted shield laws. At a
minimum, legislatures can still eliminate much of the problematic judicial
discretion that gave rise to shield laws in the first place. Stringent substantive
and procedural safeguards such as providing for prior adversary judicial
proceedings before the privilege can be divested, requiring a determination that
disclosure of the confidential source be critical to the outcome of the proceeding,
placing the burden of proof that the evidence is not available elsewhere on
the party seeking to overcome the claim of a privilege, allowing interlocutory
appeals from disclosure orders, and permitting stays of compelled disclosure
pending appeal can be implemented to protect confidential sources. Additionally,
when no overriding constitutional rights are confronted, but merely the interest
in the fair administration of justice is present, an absolute privilege against
testifying can apparently still be granted. Even under the latest decisions
adverse to shield law legislation, the opportunity for legislatures to protect
newsmen from compelled disclosure of their confidential sources remains quite
extensive. Whether they choose to exercise this ability remains an open question.
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